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RETHINKING ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Satya T. Mouland †
Abstract: The contribution of national courts to international law has long been
doubted in the international law literature. As an aspect of the state’s power to prescribe,
courts have been conceived as organs that merely apply the state’s laws, which may give
effect to an international law norm. According to this conception, national courts merely
apply and operate within the state’s national legal system and rarely have a direct
contribution to international law. However, in enforcement proceedings for international
arbitral awards, arising at the intersection between the law of state immunity and the law
governing the enforcement of arbitral awards, a number of cases challenge this
interpretation. In this area, adjudicative jurisdiction may be emerging as a specific
manifestation of the state’s enforcement jurisdiction––that is, the power to induce or
compel compliance with a state’s laws. In view of the lack of clarity regarding the lawful
scope of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction in international law, which is arising
increasingly in a globalized world where jurisdictional disputes cross territorial borders,
the approach put forward in this study may be useful for uncovering potential state
practice which may crystalize as customary international law. This article seeks to draw
attention to this practice, illustrating how a conception of adjudicative jurisdiction as
enforcement jurisdiction is not only timely and useful, but also potentially reflective of
emerging state practice. It sets some normative foundations for how such an approach
may be defensible and identifiable, thereby proposing that this topic is worthy of further
exploration.
Cite as: Satya T. Mouland, Rethinking Adjudicative Jurisdiction in International Law, 29
WASH. INT’L L.J. 173 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly globalized world in which disputes often cross
territorial borders, jurisdictional conflicts between states arise. In this
context, international law may become important for resolving questions of
which state, and on what basis, has jurisdiction. This problem emerges in
light of the recent Enrica Lexie dispute,1 currently pending before an Annex
†
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Allen, Dr. Paul Gragl, and Professor Julian Lew QC, is entitled “An Inquiry on the Scope of International
Arbitral Authority: Common Approaches to Enforcement Jurisdiction.” Satya has previously published in
the European Law Students’ Association and Asian Law Students’ Association journals. She has presented
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1
Case Overview, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), PERMANENT COURT OF
ARBITRATION, https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/117/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
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VII Tribunal, which is an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the
UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 2 The dispute arose
after two Indian fishermen were shot by Italian marines just outside Indian
territorial waters. India brought criminal proceedings against the Italian
marines, claiming the right to prosecute on the basis of the so-called “Lotus
Principle”—which holds that states have authority to adopt laws allowing
them to prosecute persons provided that the state’s actions are not prohibited
by international law. 3 Italy contested India’s jurisdiction, claiming instead
that the controversy should be governed by UNCLOS because it concerned a
question of “interpretation or application” of the treaty. 4 Thus, on the one
hand, there was a conflict between the applicable regime (UNCLOS or
general rules of jurisdiction). However, for our purposes, we are concerned
with the separate issue pertaining to the lack of clarity in the international
resolution of the dispute. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(“ITLOS”), established under UNCLOS Article 287(1)(a) and Annex VI,
issued a provisional measures order halting Indian criminal proceedings.5
However, it did not determine the merits of the matter––namely which state,
and on what basis, had jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws in respect of
the dispute? A lack of clarity in answering these questions was
acknowledged by Judge Paik in the Provisional Measures Order.6 The
dispute is now pending before an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, which is a
default method of dispute resolution for cases concerning the interpretation
or application of UNCLOS. 7 However, given the restricted mandate of the
Annex VII Tribunal to decide questions of interpretation under UNCLOS 8, it
2

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
3
The Lotus Principle, which is contentiously debated by scholars, derives from the famous Lotus
decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice and is still being relied on by states in cross-border
disputes of this context. See generally S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10
(Sept. 7).
4
See The Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Order of Aug. 24, 2015, ¶ 38,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.24_prov_meas/24_published_texts/2015_24
_Ord_24_Aug_2015-E.pdf; see also UNCLOS art. 288(1), supra note 2, at 510 (“A court or tribunal
referred to in article 287 [regarding choice of procedure] shall have jurisdiction over any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with
this [Section 2. Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions].”).
5
Enrica Lexie, Order at ¶ 141.
6
Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Declaration of Judge Paik in Order of Aug. 24, 2015,
at
¶
2,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.24_prov_meas/
24_published_texts/2015_24_O_240815_D_Pai-E.pdf (“[T]he present dispute between Italy and India
comes down to the question of which State has jurisdiction over the incident.”).
7
See Case Overview, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, supra note 1.
8
See UNCLOS Annex VII, supra note 2, at 571–74.
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is unlikely that the tribunal will address the broader question of which state
should have enforcement jurisdiction.
For our purposes, “enforcement jurisdiction” is not considered from
the narrower viewpoint adopted in some public international law texts,
which is that it is only permitted in the territory of a foreign state with that
state’s consent.9 Instead, enforcement jurisdiction, as used here, may
encompass any acts of states to “induce or compel compliance” with their
laws or through their courts. 10 This is the definition adopted in The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and will be considered
authoritative for these purposes. As acknowledged by the late Professor
Cassese, “the great jurist observes . . . that the ‘original and persistent flaw
of the international legal order’ is the lack of legislative, judicial and
enforcement organs acting on behalf of the whole community.” 11 From the
outset, it must be noted that this is inevitable, given the decentralized nature
of the international legal order, as acknowledged widely in the literature.12
However, the importance of the capacity of states to compel or induce
compliance cannot be denied. It goes to the very functioning of the
international legal order and is the means by which international law is given
effect. Professor Harold Koh has found, for example, that the principal
means by which international law is enforced are states’ abilities to induce
compliance.13 In his words, “repeated compliance gradually becomes
obedience.”14
In light of the lack of clarity regarding enforcement jurisdiction, and
its importance more generally, this article examines how “adjudicative
jurisdiction,” that is, the decision-making authority of national courts, may
be reconceived as a possible source of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction. As
9

See, e.g., Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (Malcom D. Evans ed.,
4th ed. 2014) (enforcement is only mentioned in passing, and it is stated as only permitted in the territory of
a foreign state with that state’s consent); MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 472 (8th ed. 2017).
10
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). This is
an academic document compiled by the American Law Institute and not an official document of the United
States. It has been compiled by legal academics and practitioners and is based on comparative law sources.
It will thus be considered as an authoritative source for how jurisdiction is conceived according to state
practice.
11
Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in
International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 210, 212 (1990).
12
See Thomas Schultz & Niccolo Ridi, Comity and International Courts and Tribunals, 50
CORNELL J. INT’L L. 578, 579 (2017).
13
See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997).
14
Id. at 2603.
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a source of any potential practice, decisions in the area of international
arbitration will be drawn upon. This is an area where it may be unsurprising
that such practice is emerging, given the special nature of international
arbitral tribunals as bodies constituted on the consent of the discrete parties
to the dispute (and thus operating, in principle, outside of state structures)
but which depend, for the enforcement of their decisions, on national courts.
National courts are the principal public bodies ensuring that international
arbitral tribunals’ authority is heeded.
The emergence of adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible source of any
international law rules of enforcement jurisdiction challenges the orthodox
discourse in public international law scholarship that adjudicative
jurisdiction is merely a facet of a state’s “prescriptive jurisdiction”, or its
authority to adopt laws. 15 The relevant source is customary international
law, 16 though there is no scope within this article to examine whether any
custom has crystallized. Instead, this article seeks to make a theoretical
contribution to understanding how adjudicative jurisdiction as potential
enforcement is worthy of further investigation. Such an approach would
allow new potential state practice to be considered as a source of any rules.
To test this hypothesis: first, I examine the underlying theoretical
approach that would allow adjudicative jurisdiction to be considered as a
possible manifestation of enforcement jurisdiction under public international
law; second, I examine this approach in context to illustrate how decisionmaking authority may be viewed as enforcement, focusing mainly on case
law arising in the area of international arbitration; third, I look at how an
approach which conceives of international law in national courts rather than
national courts in international law may run into difficulties, and thus
propose the latter should be adopted; fourth, I examine the extent to which
principles underpinning “authority” (that is, the power of states, generally,
under international law, which may be exercised through prescriptive,
adjudicative or enforcement power) could assist in the coordination of
consistent approaches to enforcement jurisdiction between courts (as
15

This orthodoxy is still promulgated by major textbook authors. See, e.g., Staker, supra note 9, at
309 (defining jurisdiction as “to make, apply and enforce rules of conduct[,]” which the judiciary only
applies or interprets (but does not develop)); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT.
Y. B. INT’L L. 145 (1972–73) (analyzing adjudicative jurisdiction solely as a form of state prescriptive
jurisdiction).
16
See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) (referring to international custom as a
source of international law) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
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opposed to jurisdiction as a specific exercise of state sovereignty, for
example).
II.

ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION AS AUTHORITY

Before examining the law of adjudicative jurisdiction, it is important
to understand how commentators treat the general concept. Mainstream
public international law commentators treat adjudicative jurisdiction as part
of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction.17 This means that a national court
merely has the capacity to interpret international law norms to the extent that
the state has adopted laws. Thus, their capacity to contribute to any
international law directly is inherently limited by the state where they are
located. However, as will be illustrated in the following section, adjudicative
jurisdiction ought to be considered as conceptually distinct from prescriptive
jurisdiction. This provides a useful starting point for determining potential
state practice.
A.

Adjudicative Jurisdiction as Prescriptive Jurisdiction

The first approach may be illustrated by use of the seminal Trendtex
decision.18 The Central Bank of Nigeria issued an irrevocable letter of credit
in favor of the claimant, a Swiss company, to pay for 240,000 tons of cement
that the claimant sold to an English company. 19 Upon shipping the cement,
there was congestion at the port of discharge and the Central Bank declined
to make the payments. 20 The English Court of Appeal was seized to consider
the question of whether it could exercise jurisdiction in respect of the
Central Bank of Nigeria—a governmental department of the state.
According to the international principle of state immunity, the
capacity of a state to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction in respect of a foreign
state is restricted. However, in Trendtex, the court found that due to the
principle of international law which now recognizes that sovereign immunity
should not be afforded to government departments in connection with
commercial transactions, its jurisdiction was available. Thus, for what the
court declared, it gave effect to the international law rule according to which
a state may be impleaded before the courts of foreign states insofar as its
17
18
19
20

See Staker, supra note 9; SHAW, supra note 9; Akehurst, supra note 15.
Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529 (Eng.).
Id. at 529.
Id.

178

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

commercial activities are concerned (jus gestionis). However, in terms of the
effect of that decision, the court did nothing more than declare what
Nigeria’s rights and obligations were. It did not compel or induce the
compliance of Nigeria with its obligations.
According to this approach, courts and other judicial authorities are
the means by which the state makes its law applicable to the activities,
relations, or status of persons (prescriptive jurisdiction). 21 This is reflective
of the general approach taken by authors examining adjudicative
jurisdiction. 22 These authors consider adjudicative as merely declaratory of
the state’s prescriptive power and, thus, ultimately constrained by the extent
to which the national law adopts the international norm. Thus, Trendtex is
exemplary of an approach according to which courts can be viewed as
giving effect to a state’s prescriptive power.
B.

The Lotus Decision on Jurisdiction

In order to understand the potential contribution of adjudicative
jurisdiction to international law, it is useful to distinguish this conception
from the traditional conception of jurisdiction as a specific exercise of
sovereignty. The traditional conception based on sovereignty can be traced
to the Lotus decision.23 Despite the criticisms of this approach more
generally, which will be outlined below, a conceptual distinction between
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction is in line with the Permanent Court
of International Justice’s approach in Lotus. 24
The Lotus dispute concerned a collision between French and Turkish
ships, resulting in the death of several Turkish sailors.25 Turkey exercised its
criminal jurisdiction over the French captain.26 Both parties consented to the
Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) to decide the question of
whether Turkey had been permitted to exercise such jurisdiction. 27 Thus, the
21

Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 401 (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 15; SHAW, supra note 9, at 472; Staker, supra note 9, at 309; see
also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 1992).
23
See S.S. Lotus, at 18–19; see also Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law, 84
BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 190, 190–94 (2014).
24
Though the Lotus decision has been widely criticized, it is useful, as a conceptual matter, to
distinguish it here because the basis upon which a state may exercise jurisdiction (state sovereignty) still
pervades much of the literature. See, e.g., Staker, supra note 9; SHAW, supra note 9.
25
S.S. Lotus, at 5.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 12.
22
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decision is of little authoritative guidance for this article since it concerned a
state’s prescriptive jurisdiction and not adjudicative jurisdiction. This is also
clear from the very formulation of the question before the court: “Has
Turkey . . . acted in conflict with the principles of international law[?]”28
This question differs from the one addressable here: whether there are any
principles according to which Turkey could have lawfully exercised
jurisdiction.
However, the decision still pervades much of the international law
literature on the doctrine of jurisdiction more generally, which provides a
useful foundation for distinguishing the approach being suggested herein––
that is, adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible manifestation of a state’s
general authority under international law, rather than a specific exercise of
state sovereignty. With regard to prescriptive jurisdiction, the PCIJ found
that a state is permitted to do all that it is not prohibited from doing. 29 In this
regard, the PCIJ approached the question of Turkish criminal jurisdiction
under international law in the negative—whether there were any principles
not prohibiting Turkey from exercising jurisdiction (rather than asking
whether there are any allowing the exercise). 30 This formulation suggests
that the PCIJ assumed that states have broad discretion to exercise
jurisdiction because international law governs only prohibitive rules of
jurisdiction. With regard to enforcement jurisdiction, the court stated that
this is generally prohibited within the territory of another state absent a
state’s consent. 31 This can be interpreted in line with the court’s approach to
prescriptive jurisdiction as requiring some authorizing act upon which
enforcement jurisdiction is based (a “permissive rule”).
However, viewing adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible source of
authority would not be out of step with the court’s own view on the nature of
the international legal order. It stated in this regard, at p. 18 of its judgment:
International law governs the relations between independent
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
28

Id. at 5.
See S.S. Lotus, at 18.
30
See id. at 19 (“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad,
and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.”).
31
Id.
29
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usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between these coexisting independent communities or with a view to the
achievement of common aims.
An approach which conceives of adjudicative jurisdiction as a specific
manifestation of the state’s authority which may be exercised in a number of
forms (for example, prescriptive and enforcement power) is useful for a
number of reasons. First, it does not restrict the capacity of a national court
to exercise jurisdiction under the formal consent of the particular state to the
international law norm. This observation was made by Judge Bruno Simma
in his criticism of the Lotus decision in the Kosovo advisory opinion of the
ICJ. 32 Judge Simma explained that the so-called “Lotus Principle” does not
speak to the question of the legality of jurisdiction because stating that
something is not prohibited does not logically mean it is therefore permitted.
There may be a number of principles in between permitted and prohibited
according to which a state may lawfully exercise jurisdiction, though they
are not required to do so on the basis of some authorizing act (which may,
for example, give effect to an international norm as part of national law).
The question of whether a state is required to exercise jurisdiction according
to an established international law principle (such as jus gestionis) is distinct
from the question of whether it would not be prohibited from doing so, and
such an exercise would accord with the principle of sovereign equality. Put
differently, there may be lawful grounds of adjudicative jurisdiction which
are not expressly authorized by an international law principle, but which are
still lawful because they accord with a principle underpinning authority.
“Authority” in this sense is the capacity of states to act, through prescriptive,
adjudicative, and enforcement means, and will be used interchangeably with
the concept of “jurisdiction” throughout.
Conceiving of jurisdiction as a specific exercise of sovereignty can,
moreover, be criticized from several angles. For example, a focus on the
extent to which a state may apply its own laws to foreign conduct may place
too much emphasis on a state’s sovereignty without considering the

32

See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, at 478, 480 (July 22) (Declaration of Judge Simma)
[hereinafter Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Decl. of Judge Simma].
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concomitant obligation of state responsibility under international law.33
Under the law of state responsibility, national courts are conceived as the
organs of states, and thus, to the extent that their decisions engage a norm of
international law, national courts are capable of engaging the state’s
responsibility. 34 Nonetheless, at the outset, it must be acknowledged that it is
still the dominant approach as a matter of positive law. 35
However, an approach to jurisdiction which conceives of jurisdiction
as a specific exercise of sovereignty overlooks whether there are any other
grounds upon which a state may lawfully exercise its jurisdiction over a
foreign state, which are not necessarily permitted or prohibited.
Consequently, in view of disputes such as the Enrica Lexie, where conflicts
of jurisdiction between states and jurisdictional regimes are occurring, this
approach ought to be adopted.
C.

Adjudicative Jurisdiction as Distinct from Prescriptive Jurisdiction

From this starting point of “jurisdiction” as “authority” more widely,
it becomes possible to view a state’s adjudicative jurisdiction as
manifestation of enforcement. The following sections illustrate this by
applying various lenses to case law examples in the area of international
arbitration, where this practice may be arising. Consequently, this section
illustrates the utility of an approach that understands adjudicative
jurisdiction as not merely a facet of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction through
the concrete example of national court proceedings related to arbitrations.
Though international arbitration is not the principal focus of this article, it is
an area in which national courts are the principle “public” bodies which may
ensure the enforcement of this particular international court’s decisions.36
33

See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ARGUMENT 224–302 (2007) (arguing that too much emphasis on sovereignty risks a “utopian vision
of international law.” This should be tempered with a view on responsibility).
34
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949
I.C.J. Rep. 174, at 179 (Apr. 11) (national courts may also be responsible on behalf of states as their organs
or agents); see also Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.l (Part 2).
35
See, e.g., Paul Gragl, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State in International Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 2019) (Chapter 11).
36
Though international arbitral tribunals tend to be considered as “private” institutions by a number
of arbitration scholars. See generally GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2nd ed.
2014); MARGARET MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
1 (3rd ed. 2017) (“Arbitration is a private system of adjudication. Parties who arbitrate have decided to
resolve their disputes outside any judicial system.”); NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON
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Thus, it is the principal source of any potential practice relating to the lawful
scope of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction.
1.

Applying Scelle’s Dédoublement Fonctionnel

To better understand this perspective, it is useful to apply the lens of
Georges Scelle’s dédoublement fonctionnel theory.37 Scelle argued that courts
have a dual role when they act within the international legal sphere: not only
as state organs that apply national law, but also as international agents
(gouvernants et agents specifiquement internationaux). According to this,
even while applying a rule of national law, a national court may act in the
international sphere insofar as its decision engages a norm of international
law. Put differently, when a national court acts in the international legal
sphere and exercises jurisdiction, the exercise of its authority may engage a
norm of international law.
To illustrate the consequences of such an approach, take the example
of LR Avionics.38 LR Avionics, a company registered in Israel, had obtained
an arbitration award against the Federal Republic of Nigeria in a dispute
arising out of a contract between them for the supply of military
equipment. 39 The arbitration was seated in Nigeria and subject to Nigerian
law. 40 LR Avionics applied to a U.K. court for enforcement of the arbitral
award.41 Despite there being no link to U.K. territorial jurisdiction as a
matter of private or public international law (or the “public sphere”), an
English commercial court ended up considering the scope of its authority to
enforce the award. 42 For our purposes, this is a potential exercise in the
international sphere, seeing as there was no connection to the state’s
territorial jurisdiction, and thus, no national law that could justify the
exercise of the court’s authority on its own. The court found that it had the
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 415 (6th ed. 2015). However, some public international law scholars have
considered international arbitral tribunals as potential international law courts to the extent that they
exercise decision-making authority in the public sphere. See, e.g., ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE,
IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1 (2014).
37
On the doctrine of dédoublement fonctionel see generally GEORGES SCELLE, 1 PRÉCIS DE DROIT
DES GENS 43, 54–56, 214 (1932) (Vol I); GEORGES SCELLE, 2 PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS 10, 319, 450
(1934); see also Cassese, supra note 11.
38
See LR Avionics Technologies Limited v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, Attorney General of
the Federation of Nigeria [2016] EWHC (Comm) 1751 (Eng.).
39
Id. at [4].
40
Id.
41
Id. at [7].
42
Id. at [4]. As the seat of the arbitration was Nigeria, the arbitral body applied Nigerian law; the
defendant was the Republic of Nigeria and the claimant was registered in Israel.
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power to declare the foreign award as enforceable, and such a power was not
excluded by the foreign state’s immunity. 43 From a perspective of how the
decision is declaratory of any international law rule, one might point to the
court’s reasoning with regard to the availability of its jurisdiction to declare
the award enforceable under section 101 Arbitration Act of 1996. 44 This
gives effect to Article I of the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) 45 as part of U.K.
law, providing for the enforcement of arbitral awards irrespective of where
they are made. The Commercial Court found that Section 101 proceedings to
enforce an award are “proceedings which relate to the arbitration” within the
meaning of Section 9 of the SIA and thus do not attract immunity. 46 Thus,
for what the court declared, it found that its jurisdiction was not excluded by
the foreign state’s immunity. However, when viewing the court’s exercise of
authority in the public sphere as potential evidence of any rule, it is possible
to understand the act of enforcing––what the court did––as another source of
any potential international law rule. Put differently, as a consequence of the
court’s excercise of its jurisdiction to ensure that the award was declared
enforceable in the public sphere, this may be suggestive that this form of
jurisdiction arises as an aspect of the court’s general jurisdiction and
principles of immunity operate as lex specialis to this. Insofar as such a rule
is shared widely by other courts in the public sphere, this might be evidence
of a growing rule according to which the power to declare an award
enforceable is a generally lawful aspect of a court’s international
adjudicative authority.
2.

Third Restatement

The new edition of The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, a source compiled on the basis of comparative law
research by the American Law Institute, also reflects this conceptual
distinction between adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction. 47 It has added
“adjudicative jurisdiction” as a separate category to prescriptive and
enforcement jurisdiction. 48 In his commentary on the Third Restatement, the
43

Id. at [21]–[23].
Id.; see Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 101 (Eng.).
45
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
46
LR Avionics, at [21] – [23].
47
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
48
See id.
44
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late Cecil J. Olmstead, former president of the International Law Association
and an advisor on the Third Restatement, points out that the addition of
adjudicative jurisdiction does not just reflect an actualization of prescriptive
jurisdiction (i.e., an exercise of the “law-making process” by the state
through its courts under international law) but is rather the manifestation of a
specific exercise of enforcement jurisdiction (i.e., the enforcement of a
prescription through a judicial process). 49 This seems to acknowledge, at
least as a conceptual matter, that adjudicative jurisdiction is a separate
source of international law and a possible source of a state’s enforcement
power. Moreover, under section 431, “jurisdiction to enforce,” the
relationship between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction is
quite clear: a state may only enforce its laws if it has jurisdiction to prescribe
such laws. 50 However, there is no such limitation prescribed under section
421, “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” In this respect, in principle, a state may
exercise jurisdiction through its courts whenever it would be “reasonable”.51
Consequently, the Third Restatement also supports an approach according to
which there is no inherent restriction on a state’s authority to adjudicate to
the prescriptive power of the state. Instead, through the addition of
“adjudicative jurisdiction” as an additional category, the authors of the Third
Restatement have acknowledged that adjudicative jurisdiction may be a
separate source, and thus, a separate source of potential state practice.
III.

ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION AS A SPECIFIC EXERCISE OF
ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION—UNCOVERING DIFFERENT APPROACHES

This section will illustrate, through a selection of representative case
law examples in the area of arbitration, the different ways in which
adjudicative jurisdiction may be treated as enforcement jurisdiction. This
further supports the theoretical approach (that considers adjudicative
jurisdiction as state authority) laid out in the previous sections by
demonstrating its relevance in the practice of national courts. The first
approach considers how national courts may act as enforcement agents as a
consequence of the enactment of an international norm as domestic law. The
second approach considers how courts may attain this status from the
inherent powers of domestic courts in international law. The third approach
49

See Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 468, 469–70 (1989).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
51
Id. § 421 (“A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a
person or thing if the relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of
jurisdiction reasonable.”) (emphasis added).
50
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considers the issue through comparison of the approaches of different
national courts’ legal reasoning in decisions engaging international norms.
This third comparative approach considers situations where national courts
exercise authority despite there being no connection between the forum and
the controversy.
Beginning with the first approach, a domestic court may be obliged to
recognize it has jurisdiction because of the enactment of an international rule
within national law. Viewed on their own, judicial decisions are merely
declaratory of the scope of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction. This point can
be illustrated not only by the effect of the Trendtex decision, as examined
above, but also by its reasoning. In Trendtex, Lord Denning stated “in the
last 50 years there has been a complete transformation in the functions of the
sovereign state. Nearly every country engages in commercial activities. It
has its departments of state––or creates its own legal entities––which go into
the market places of the world. They charter ships. They buy commodities.
They issue letters of credit”. 52 As a result of what Denning now stated to be
a “modern rule of international law”, he found that since Nigeria engaged in
these commercial activities, “it is [not] open to the Government of Nigeria to
claim sovereign immunity in respect of commercial transaction”.53
Consequently, the court’s decision could, at best, be viewed as declaring the
existence of the principle54 of jus gestionis.
Reversing the mode of analysis to consider not merely international
law in national courts, but national courts in international law, new potential
practice on enforcement may be considered. In his article, Domestic Courts
in International Law: The International Judicial Function of National
Courts, Professor Antonios Tzanakopoulos points out that domestic
decisions may be “constitutive” of rules of international law. 55 As such, we
should consider “domestic courts in international law” rather than
“international law in domestic courts.”56 To consider the latter, it is useful to
apply Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of law to consider whether adjudicative
52

Trendtex, at 555.
Id.
54
This is a (normative) principle rather than a rule. See, e.g., HAZEL FOX & PHILLIPA WEBB, THE
LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 484 (Sir Frank Berman ed., 3d ed. 2013). Since there are still other approaches,
jus gestionis can at best be considered a principle which has not yet crystallised into a source of
international law.
55
Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial
Function of National Courts, 34 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 133, 135 (2011).
56
Id. 133–37.
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jurisdiction may be a manifestation of enforcement jurisdiction according to
an inherent power of national courts. 57 From the “practical necessity”
(praktische Vernunft) perspective, Kant describes the possibility that law
may have some inherent quality. 58 An act or a principle, for example,
freedom (Wille) is distinguished from freedom of choice (Willkür). While
freedom of choice is a desire that is not merely based in an action, but also in
a reason for choosing to act in a certain way, freedom is fundamentally
grounded in practical necessity. This perspective might be fruitfully applied
to the notion that national courts’ actions, and not merely their decisions,
may be constitutive of law. If courts consistently act in a particular way—
such that (though they may not expressly state as much) the effect of their
decisions is enforcement—then a practical necessity perspective would
justify considering such practice as law. This is because there is something
inherent in the act, which may itself be constitutive of law when taken
together with other similar acts (to the extent it is in conformity with
principles underpinning international law).
To illustrate the effect that this approach would have to understanding
adjudicative jurisdiction as potential state practice on enforcement, consider
the decision in Diag Human. 59 In Diag Human, a Liechtenstein blood
plasma company sought to enforce an award against the Czech Republic in
the U.S. courts.60 As a matter of private international law, neither the parties
nor the controversy had links to the United States or came under U.S.
jurisdiction. 61 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed the case, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the award
because there was no commercial relationship between the parties, and
therefore, the New York Convention did not apply. 62 The New York
Convention requires contracting states (of which there are 159, including the
United States) to enforce international arbitration awards “irrespective of
where they are made.” However, the United States has adopted a reservation
in limiting the application of this principle to “commercial” activities.63
57

See generally Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353–603
(Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797).
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See id. at 370–85.
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Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Rep. Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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Id. at 132.
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Id.
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Id. at 134.
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Upon appeal, the district court’s dismissal was reviewed de novo. 64 This
time, the U.S. Court of Appeals considered the scope of its authority to
enforce the award broadly and in accordance with specific requirements of
foreign state immunity enacted in U.S. law. 65 Section 1605(a)(6) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) provides the general exception
in respect of proceedings related to arbitrations. 66 The court found that under
section 1605(a)(6) there was a legal relationship between the parties and a
governing legal instrument, and consequently, it could exercise its
jurisdiction to recognise and enforce the arbitral award.67 Thus, by
interpreting the FSIA’s exception in the negative, and considering its
jurisdiction as not excluded under the statute, the court exercised jurisdiction
to enforce the award.
However, the Diag Human court’s exercise could not be identified if
one scrutinized the reasoning of the court alone. In other words, the court did
not expressly state that it would be permitted to exercise jurisdiction to
enforce the award because some national or international norm obliged it to
do so. Nonetheless, the effect of the exercise ensured enforcement of the
award in conformity with the principle of enforceability under the New York
Convention. Though the New York Convention was not the source of the
court’s authority, it informed the court’s decision as to why it ought to
exercise its authority. 68 Accordingly to this, the court exercised authority in
the public sphere to enforce the award.
Widening out to the third approach it becomes possible to identify
further practice which may crystallize into customary international law.69
Customary international law requires widespread, consistent and
representative practice. 70 As explained, it is not being examined whether this
64

Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 134.
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28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2016).
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Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 134–37.
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See Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Rep. Ministry of Health, 907 F.3d 606, 608–09 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(“We enforce foreign arbitral awards according to the New York Convention, part of a carefully crafted
framework for the enforcement of international arbitration awards.”) (internal quotations removed). Thus,
the New York Convention is merely the framework within which the national court considers the scope of
its authority but does not oblige them to exercise jurisdiction.
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70
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has emerged in any particular area, but rather how an approach which
conceives of exercises of adjudicative jurisdiction as potential state “acts”
may contribute to the identification of such practice. This might begin with
the second approach for identification of such practice, which examines
other exercises of decision-making authority to find commonalities between
national courts. Thus, to the extent that national courts exercise enforcement
forms of authority consistently with each other and in accordance with the
relevant principles of international law which underpin authority, 71 this may
be evidence of growing customary international law relating to lawful
grounds of enforcement jurisdiction.
Beginning with the Diag Human decision, there are many decisions in
other jurisdictions in which national courts have effectively exercised
enforcement jurisdiction to ensure that an international arbitration award
would be declared enforceable. For example, in Svenska Petroleum, 72 in
France, an arbitration award was rendered against the Republic of Lithuania
in favor of a Swedish company, Svenska Petroleum, according to the
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules. The parties
had selected these rules to govern their dispute. However, a U.K. court—
without any territorial connection to the dispute—was faced with deciding
whether it could enforce the award. The court found that it had jurisdiction
over the proceeding to declare the award enforceable because the arbitral
award fell within the meaning of Section 9 of the UK State Immunity Act
1976 (“SIA”). 73 Consequently, the court followed the approach in LR
Avionics and exercised jurisdiction to enforce the award. Thus, both for what
the court decided and its exercise of authority to enforce, the decision may
be viewed as a possible source of state practice to the extent that the same
approach is shared by other courts. The consequence of any such practice
would be that, at least as far as a court’s power to declare an award
enforceable, this form of jurisdiction would be viewed, as between those
courts, as a lawful exercise of enforcement.

https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1107; Brian Lepard,
The Need for a New Theory, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS 6 (2010) (“[T]he traditional definition of customary international law as consisting of the
dual elements of state practice and opinio juris has a long pedigree.”).
71
See infra Part V.
72
Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Government of the Republic of Lithuania [2006] EWCA
(Civ) 1529, [2007] QB 886 (Eng.).
73
Svenska Petroleum, at [116].
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POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MONISM AND DUALISM DISTINCTION ON
UNDERSTANDING ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Through examination of the different approaches of monism and
dualism, this section further illustrates why national courts’ contributions
should be perceived as a question of domestic courts in international law
rather than international law in domestic courts. For these purposes,
“monism” and “dualism” describe how the national and international legal
orders relate to each other. Monism treats the national and international legal
systems as part of the same system. 74 Dualism views national and
international legal systems as separate in principle, and thus, generally
requires the national legislature to adopt an international norm for it to
become binding in the state’s national courts.75
From the perspective of how international law is given effect in
national courts, it might be easier to see how a national court could
contribute to international law from the monist perspective as it
automatically views international law as part of national law. The basic
approach of monism is well explained by the monist, Hans Kelsen.76 In his
influential work, Pure Theory of Law, the Austrian jurist theorized that every
legal concept and body of law derives its legal validity from some basic
norm (Grundnorm). Thus, legal principles and concepts belong to a body of
law but also derive their validity (or existence) as law from the basic norms
that govern them. According to this perspective, an exercise of decisionmaking authority by a national court could contribute to international law in
a more direct sense. To illustrate this through case law in a monist state, such
as France, consider Creighton v. Qatar. 77 In 1982, Creighton Limited
concluded a contract to construct a hospital in Qatar. The contract provided
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Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 187 (2d ed. 2007).
See Jordan J. Paust, Basic Forms of International Law and Monist, Dualist and Realist
Perspectives, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – MONISM & DUALISM 244, 246 (Marko
Novakovic ed., 2013).
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See generally HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE: EINLEITUNG IN DIE RECHSTWISSENSCHAFT
[PURE THEORY OF LAW] (Max Knight ed. & trans., Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1934). See also Torben
Spaak, Kelsen on Monism and Dualism, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – MONISM &
DUALISM 322–43 (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013).
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Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court of judicial matters] 1e civ., July 6, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No.
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2000, 18 ASA Bulletin 605–09 (2000).
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for the final settlement of disputes by ICC arbitration. 78 After a dispute
arose, an arbitration award was rendered in favor of Creighton, which
subsequently sought to attach funds of the Qatari Ministry of Domestic
Affairs held in France by the Qatar National Bank and the Banque de
France. Since the question of the Cour de Cassation’s jurisdiction to order
attachment against Qatar arose “in light of principles of public international
law concerning immunities of the foreign state,” the case presented the
French judiciary with an opportunity to consider the scope of its execution
jurisdiction. 79 The court ordered attachment of Qatar’s assets, stating that it
was sufficient that the arbitral award became binding, to establish its
jurisdiction. 80 This line of reasoning conflicts with the notion that sovereign
immunity exempts a court’s execution jurisdiction. 81 The court cited Article
24 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, which provides that binding ICC awards
must be enforced, as a principle that justified the exercise of its jurisdiction
in the public sphere.82 However, the court exercised its jurisdiction “in light
of the public international law principles governing immunities.” 83 Thus,
even as a declaratory matter, the case can be viewed as an instance of a
national court’s contribution to the potential lawfulness of execution
jurisdiction in this context (arbitration) because the court itself stated that its
jurisdiction was not excluded by the international principle of state
immunity. Put differently, since immunity places the principal bar on a
court’s enforcement authority, then a declaration that it does not might
support a principle according to which execution jurisdiction is generally
permissible.
On the other hand, in dualist states, such as the United Kingdom, it
may be more difficult to point to significant decisions which have developed
the law on enforcement jurisdiction since international law is not the source
of the court’s authority but is given effect through national legislation. To
78

Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court of judicial matters] 1e civ., July 6, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No.
207 (Fr.). For an English translation of the facts, see Creighton Limited v. Minister of Finance and Minister
of Internal Affairs and Agriculture of the Government of the State of Qatar, Cour de Cassation [Supreme
Court], 6 July 2000, in XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 443–534 (Albert Jan Van de Berg ed.,
2000).
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Creighton Limited, supra note 77, at 608.
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Id. (“vu les principes du droit international . . . attendu d’en execution de sentences arbitrales
devenues définitives” [“having regard to principles of public international law . . . pending execution of
final arbitral awards”])
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As put forward in major state immunity textbooks. See, e.g., Fox & Webb, supra note 54, at 484.
82
Creighton Limited, supra note 77, at 608.
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illustrate, in the area of state immunity, the United Kingdom has adopted
legislation that gives effect to the international principle of state immunity as
a matter of national law. Under section 1 of the SIA, a state is prohibited
from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state unless a specific enumerated
exception applies. Consequently, exercises of decision-making authority
arising as an exception to this rule may be authorized, at least formally, by a
national law provision (such as section 9 of the SIA in the case of
arbitration). A good example is the Pearl Petroleum decision, which
concerned a London Court of Arbitration (“LCIA”) proceeding between
Pearl Petroleum, a Swiss company, and the Kurdistan Republic of Iraq.84
During arbitration the Kurdistan Republic failed to comply with certain
orders of the tribunal, as a result, the tribunal issued a peremptory order that
instructed the Kurdistan Republic to pay Pearl Petroleum $100 million.85
Under section 42 of the Arbitration Act of 1996, U.K. courts are
empowered to enforce arbitral tribunal peremptory orders. Consequently, the
question of whether the court could exercise jurisdiction in this case arose at
the intersection between the law governing the enforcement of peremptory
orders and the law of state immunity, rather than as a direct consequence of
implementation of the international principle of state immunity.86 When Iraq
failed to comply with the order, Pearl Petroleum applied to the U.K.
Commercial Court for enforcement of the order. The court rendered a
decision in Pearl Petroleum’s favor.87 Thus, by the court’s exercise of
authority in respect of the foreign state, its act was declaratory of a potential
rule relating to the legality of supportive jurisdiction. Thus, the approach
suggested may become more important in order to fully analyze the
contribution of courts located in states which adopt dualist approaches. For
what it did, rather than said, the court’s act may be evidence of the rule that
an exercise of its supportive jurisdiction is permissible. Thus, the “act,” or
particular “exercise,” by the court rather than merely what the court said
becomes all the more important where international law is an indirect source
of the court’s decision-making authority.
Thus, at least from the perspective of how international law is given
effect in national courts, distinctions between the state’s approach to sources
84
Pearl Petroleum Company Limited v. The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq [2015] EWHC
(Comm) 3361, [2016] 4 WLR 2 (Eng.).
85
Id. at [11].
86
Id. at [16] (considering the application state immunity).
87
Id. at [53].

192

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

may provide limitations on the extent to which they can be understood to
contribute to international law. Viewing national courts in international law,
on the other hand, would allow their potential contribution to be considered
irrespective of these distinctions. One method would be to compare
exercises of decision-making authority in the international sphere, as
illustrated in the previous section.
V.

PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING AUTHORITY FOR THE COORDINATION OF
COMMON APPROACHES

Considering exercises of authority as possible sources of any state
practice on enforcement jurisdiction, which has been the overall aim of this
article, the question arises as to how we should coordinate the approaches of
national courts. This question emerges where consistent approaches may
emerge which have not yet crystallized into customary international law. The
works of Anne-Marie Slaughter, a legal theorist, and Yuval Shany, an
international lawyer, have considered coordination of courts.88 In Regulating
Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, Shany
studies the need to regulate jurisdictional interactions between national and
international courts and any rules of international law that should, or could,
govern such interactions. 89 However, Shany only considers how courts may
have an interpretative function in international law, and not if their decisionmaking authority could make more fundamentally contribute to international
law. 90
Similarly, taking a globalist viewpoint, Slaughter considers how
national courts may cooperate according to “common goals.”91 Though both
authors demonstrate the normative desirability of coordination of courts, the
lens of coordination has not been applied in a practical way to determine
88
See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 191 (2003); Yuval Shany, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL
RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2007); Yuval Shany, THE COMPETING
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2004).
89
SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 88, at 4.
90
Id. at 5, 32–34 (considering only the “de facto” relationship between courts and tribunals, which
creates shared “harmonizing features”). Interaction is considered under provisions of the ICSID
Convention, which permits investors to initiate proceedings without the need to seize national courts. Thus,
the extent to which national courts or other bodies are actually coordinated according to law is not
analyzed, but merely how under certain harmonizing instruments these bodies could be coordinated as a
normative matter.
91
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whether national courts are actually coordinated in any particular area. This
final section examines how principles of international law may assist in the
coordination of consistent approaches amongst national courts, thus
illustrating which principles may already harmonize consistent approaches.
A.

Comity

The first potential harmonizing principle is comity. According to its
most widely accepted definition, at least in the field of private international
law, comity is the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, execution and judicial acts of another nation.”.92 However,
there is a wide variety of understandings regarding the legal nature of
comity. On the one hand, some scholars, such as F. A. Mann, find that
comity is merely a “byword for international law.” 93 From this
understanding, comity binds the courts to exercise jurisdiction because
international law necessitates they do so. 94 At the other end of the spectrum,
comity may merely be a discretionary principle according to which the court
may exercise jurisdiction depending on the particular facts of the case.95 In
between these two viewpoints exists the idea that comity is binding in some
way which requires deference of one court to another in view of some
international or foreign interest.96 Whichever view is adopted, all seem to
agree that comity plays some kind of jurisdiction-regulating rule because it
ensures that one court has jurisdiction rather than another, thereby operating
as a jurisdiction-allocating tool.97
Authors such as F. A. Mann who consider comity as public
international law-related in nature (i.e., binding on courts as a matter of
international law) work primarily in the field of private international law and

92
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today. See, e.g., Niels Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards A Coherent Treatment of
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refer merely to the effects of comity within domestic systems. 98 From the
sovereign’s perspective, this comity is understandably international in nature
since its purpose is, in some respects, international: the recognition of one
sovereign’s acts within another sovereign’s system.
However, from a public international law perspective, comity does not
bind national courts in the same way that international law does. 99 This can
be illustrated by the use of comity in courts where the exercise of decisionmaking authority has the potential to engage an international law norm
(given there is no connection between the court and the dispute). This
occurred, for example, in one of the national court proceedings related to the
Yukos dispute with a number of shareholders, inter alia, Hulley
Enterprises.100
Hulley Enterprises, a Cypriot company, was a major shareholder in
Yukos, a Russian privatized oil company. 101 In 2003, the Russian Federation
took a series of actions against Yukos, including ordering it to pay a total of
$20 million in taxes.102 In 2004, shareholders, including Hulley Enterprises,
notified the Russian Federation that Yukos had violated the Energy Charter
Treaty (“ECT”), claiming that the company had failed to accord fair and
equitable treatment to investors.103 The ECT establishes a multilateral
framework for cross-border cooperation in energy disputes and provides for
arbitration as the default method of dispute resolution. In 2014, an arbitral
tribunal appointed under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration,
rendered three final arbitration awards against Yukos, finding it had violated
the ECT. 104 The shareholders sought enforcement of the awards in several
countries, including the United States, where actions were commenced in
U.S. federal court seeking confirmation of the awards.105 The Russian
Federation claimed that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, and thus the
98
See generally Federick Alexander Mann, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS (1986); Federick
Alexander Mann, BEITRÄGE ZUM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT [CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL
PRIVATE LAW] (Duncker & Humblot 1976); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty
Years, supra note 193.
99
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100
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court had no jurisdiction to confirm the awards.106 Proceedings to appeal a
decision to set aside the awards were also pending before a Dutch court.107
In considering whether to grant a stay of proceedings pending an appeal
against setting aside the awards in the Netherlands, the U.S. District Court
found that the principle of comity would weigh in favor of the stay. 108 Thus,
the court not only considered its jurisdiction available, notwithstanding the
principle of immunity, but also actually exercised a supportive form of
jurisdiction (i.e., a stay) to halt its proceedings in favor of the arbitration. For
our purposes, it is significant that the court considered comity weighed in
favor of the stay. This was in view of the parallel Dutch proceedings, as the
court stated:
[I]n contrast, if the Dutch judgment is affirmed on appeal, the
shareholders may choose to stipulate to dismissal of this action
in view of this court's questionable ability to confirm an award
that has been “lawfully ‘set aside’ by a competent authority in
the state in which the award was made.” Should the
shareholders choose to proceed, this court would have to
consider interests in international comity and the avoidance of
conflicting judgments as part of its analysis as to whether any
such agreement existed. 109
This is exemplary of how comity is generally used in this context. It is
not used as a justification for the source of the court’s power but as the
reason why the court should exercise the jurisdiction at its discretion in favor
of the party seeking enforcement or resisting it. Consequently, from the
perspective of national courts in international law, comity is no more than a
discretionary principle, which may be used by courts as appropriate.
This can be further demonstrated by the exemplary case of Hardy
Exploration. 110 Hardy Exploration & Production (“HEPI”), an Indian
company, had obtained an arbitration award under a contract with the
Government of India.111 The arbitration proceedings took place in Malaysia,
as provided for in the contract, and the tribunal issued an award in HEPI’s
106
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favor.112 HEPI then sought to confirm the award in a U.S. court. India sought
to have the U.S. proceedings stayed on the ground that the specific
performance aspect of the award violated U.S. public policy. 113 In deciding
not to recognize the order for specific performance, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia found that the reason was because it would raise
U.S. vulnerability, opening up the United States to “claims against it for its
sovereign acts within its own borders.” 114 Indeed, one of the justifications
used by the court as to why it would stay proceedings and not recognize the
order was the fact that comity counters against “[a]ctions against foreign
sovereigns in our courts [which] raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign
relations of the United States.”115 However, this is a clear illustration of the
type of political context in which the court might consider comity to be
applicable. It does not relate to whether, as a matter of public international
law, the court is obliged to exercise jurisdiction. It relates to whether there is
a matter that the court considers an international concern—for example,
whether it is permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state in view of
the international principle of immunity. There are currently no clear
circumstances in which courts are obliged to exercise jurisdiction in this
context on the basis of comity.
B.

Sovereign Equality

Sovereign equality is a foundational principle of the international
legal order. As subjects of international law, states only have relative
sovereignty. 116 Kelsen explains that, while sovereignty is of the supremacy
of states under international law (insofar as they are not subjected to the
authority of another state), sovereign equality is the justification for legal
authority itself. 117 This does not mean that states have equal rights and duties
under international law, but that they have the same capacity for rights and
duties.118 Consequently, sovereign equality underpins the authority of states
to act, more generally, under international law (rather than to exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of sovereignty). Thus, to the extent that courts act in
accordance with each other and the relevant principles of international law
112
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applicable to a particular exercise of jurisdiction, such acts might be
considered to be in conformity with the principle of sovereign equality.
Taking the example of Yukos as one starting point for examining the
effect of this approach, Yukos, a Luxembourg company which had been a
member of the “Yukos” group in Russia, had obtained an arbitration award
against OJSC Rosneft Oil, a Russian state-owned company. 119 The decision
concerned preliminary questions relating to the enforcement of four
International Commercial Arbitration Court (“ICAC”) awards, 120 which a
Russian court had already annulled at the seat of arbitration.121 Given that
assets against which enforcement was sought were located in the
Netherlands, leave to enforce the award was granted by the presiding Dutch
court. The basis for this was that the decision of the Russian court had been
“partial and dependent,” with the consequence that the set-aside decision
would not be recognized.122 The U.K. commercial court to which Yukos had
applied to confirm the award found that the defendant, Rosneft, was issueestopped from denying that the Russian annulment decisions were the result
of a partial and dependent proceeding as found by the Dutch court. This
means that Rosneft could not rely on the argument that the Russian decisions
were not partial and dependent in an attempt to challenge jurisdiction when
the argument had already been relied on by them to appeal the earlier
decision. Thus, by exercising jurisdiction to recognize the lack of validity of
the Russian annulment decisions, the U.K. court, in effect, ensured that
proceedings to enforce the award would be continued.
One justification for such jurisdiction is the aim of enforcement of
arbitral award irrespective of where they are enshrined in the New York
Convention. However, in national court enforcement decisions relating to
arbitral awards, the New York Convention is not treated as the source of the
court’s authority. Instead, the principle of enforceability in article 1(1) of the
convention, stating that awards must be enforced “irrespective of where they
are made,” 123 is a normative principle according to which the court ought to
enforce the award. 124 Thus, the court in Yukos could be viewed, from the
international perspective, as ensuring enforceability in accordance with
119
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122
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124
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article 1(1) of the New York Convention even though it was not the source
of the court’s authority.
Alternatively, the source of the authority could be a growing principle
of customary international law according to which the jurisdiction is lawful
because several courts exercise similar forms of enforcement jurisdiction in
accordance with the applicable principles of international law (including the
principle of enforcement in the New York Convention). Such a principle
might be justified by the principle of sovereign equality to the extent that
common approaches, which accord with any applicable international
principle (such as, here, state immunity) are shared between the affected
courts. 125
C.

Rule of Law

The final principle according to which common approaches between
national courts could be coordinated is the rule of law. The rule of law in
national legal systems is comprised of two elements: the legality of an
exercise of public power (that is, the conformity with law)126 and the law’s
justness.127 However, at the international level there is a third element:
effective implementation. 128 Professor Robert McCorquodale explains that at
the international law level, unlike at the national law level, the rule of law
has an additional enforcement function. 129 This is because there is no
sovereign at the international law level like at the national law level; thus,
125
This is because customary international law requires widespread, consistent, and representative
practice between affected states. If courts are “states” in such an analysis, then the practice would have to
be shared between the affected courts.
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LAW AND MORALITY 210 (Clarendon Press 1979). Most formalists go beyond this to encompass notions of
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the rule of law would be of little effect without this additional principle. As
Professor McCorquodale explains, “there is now an extensive range of
international dispute settlement mechanisms that can operate in a manner
that is consistent with the international rule of law.” 130 However, these only
emerge when one does not equate the national rule of law with the
international rule of law, which McCorquodale states to be a “false
equation”.131 From the perspective of adjudicative authority as merely
declaratory of the state’s prescriptive jurisdiction, Professor Andre
Nollkaemper has analyzed the possible contribution of national courts to the
international rule of law as negligible. 132 This is because Professor
Nollkaemper only considers the international rule of law as comparable to
the national rule of law, to the extent that public powers may be “controlled”
by law, this is according to the concept of “accountability.” 133 Thus, he does
not address the question of whether national courts can themselves be
“agents” of the international rule of law to the extent that they exercise the
state’s enforcement function.
To understand the perspective that national courts may be agents of
the international law, it is useful to distinguish the effect of such an approach
from the effect of the principle of sovereign equality in this area. To
illustrate, the Yukos decision and Pearl Petroleum decisions may be
compared.
In Yukos, the setting aside of the award in view of the aim of
enforcement could be viewed as giving effect to the principle of sovereign
equality: the act of exercising jurisdiction did not itself give effect to a rule
of enforcement, but rather the underlying reasoning for the exercise could be
viewed as giving effect to that rule. To the extent that national courts follow
similar reasoning in accordance with the relevant principles of international
law (e.g., award enforceability and state immunity), then such exercises
conform with the principle of sovereign equality. Compare this with Pearl
Petroleum where the question to the U.K. commercial court was whether to
recognize the peremptory order issued by the arbitral tribunal. As explained,
it was the exercise of jurisdiction in the public sphere that gave effect to the
130
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rule in this regard. Thus, whereas decisions that are declaratory of particular
rule could be justified on the basis of sovereign equality, exercises in the
public sphere could themselves be justified because they are manifestations
of the rule of law. This is because these exercises engage international law
norms (since they are not connected to the territory of any one state) and
thus, they may, by their nature, be manifestations of principles underpinning
authority.
However, there are some risks with treating national courts as
potential conduits of the international rule of law. For example, courts might
purport to act in the name of the international rule of law, when in fact they
are applying a national rule that may not accord with the international one.
For example, a national court may exercise jurisdiction under the national
authorizing statute, ignoring the wider context in which the rule it is
applying developed, and thereby create bad law. This occurred in Republic
of Argentina v. NML Capital. 134 There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
FSIA does not restrict the discovery of a foreign state’s extraterritorial assets
in aid of post-judgment attachment, and thus the court had jurisdiction under
the FSIA to grant such a measure. The court stated that its jurisdiction to
grant the measure is based on the FSIA, which is the “sole basis” for federal
court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns because the FSIA is a
“comprehensive” and “exhaustive” statement of the law in this regard.135
Thus, the court essentially analyzed the scope of its jurisdiction to grant the
measure on the text of the FSIA alone.
Whether the decision to grant the discovery order is correct or not as a
matter of principle, the reasoning that jurisdiction is based on a power
granted to the state under the FSIA is flawed. It rests on a formalistic
interpretation of the principle of state immunity within the context of the
FSIA, failing to acknowledge that this act gives effect to the international
principle of state immunity that restricts a court’s adjudicative jurisdiction in
respect of a foreign state. Even if the discovery order could be viewed as a
lawful exercise of enforcement, viewed on its own, it is unclear whether this
particular exercise of jurisdiction would be in accordance with the
international principle of state immunity.
134
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Thus, when considering the decisions of national courts, it is
important that only decisions that properly apply relevant principles of
international law, or those that can be rendered compatible with them, are
recognized. It remains unclear whether the discovery order in NML Capital
could have been rendered compatible with the principle of state immunity.
On the one hand, it seems that it does not compel certain action against the
foreign state, but merely assists in an ongoing proceeding. On the other
hand, the proceeding which it assists would have the effect of compelling the
foreign state to comply with a judgment. Thus, it is questionable whether the
act of the court, in effect, is lawful or ought to be viewed as excluded by the
international principle of immunity.
Thus, while the international rule of law may, in theory, be a
harmonizing principle, its integration within national legal systems raises
certain issues regarding integration. One solution, which could be a subject
of further research, would be to consider how exercises of decision-making
authority may be constitutive of particular international principles
underpinning authority, thereby applying these principles to determine the
extent of “harmonization” of national court approaches irrespective of
monist and dualist distinctions.136
VI.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, this article has illustrated that reconsidering adjudicative
jurisdiction as a possible manifestation of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction
is a worthy question for further exploration. Such a conception may assist in
the identification of potential state practice relating to the lawful scope of a
state’s enforcement jurisdiction. This practice may, in turn, crystallize into
customary international law, thereby providing solutions in cases such as
Enrica Lexie where the lawful scope of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction has
been at issue and remained unresolved.
This article has examined the normative underpinning of this
conception of adjudicative jurisdiction and how it gives public international
lawyers a new framework to consider the decisions of national courts as a
possible source of international law. As evidence of this practice, case law
arising in the area of international arbitration has been analyzed and
illustrates the validity of the approaches defended.
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Further research could be conducted, applying some of the analytical
threads examined herein, to identify whether there is any consistent practice
in relation to the enforcement powers of national courts in the context of
international arbitrations. Indeed, this is the subject matter of my PhD thesis.
This article has merely sown the seeds of a normative approach which
considers national courts in international law rather than international law in
national courts. Adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible source of
international law would allow public international lawyers to analyze
decision-making authority in a more comprehensive manner and could
provide a possible source of much needed rules of enforcement jurisdiction.
This is useful, and arguably necessary, as jurisdictional conflicts will
increasingly arise in our globalized world, and there is a lack of doctrinal
clarity in the area of enforcement jurisdiction.

